Excerpts from “Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations” by U.S. General John Abizaid,
published by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September
2002:
• “Urban operations increase support demands due to the high level of injury and exhaustion of personnel, damage to equipment, and to the potential need to provide support to non-combatants.”
• “In combat operations, the need to secure cities building by building, room by room, requires large numbers of infantry.”
• “Nearly all operations in urban areas, including predominantly air operations, take significantly longer than originally expected.”
• “Urban operations result in a significant increase in ammunition expenditure, need for personnel replacements, medical personnel and supplies, casualty evacuation, and food and water. . . . Commanders and planners must make every effort to anticipate and specifically plan for these resources.”
• “Forces will need reconstitution more frequently. . . . Historically, it is necessary to pull units back for rest and reconstitution far more frequently in urban combat than in other types of operations. . . . When that is coupled with the high casualty rates normally associated with urban combat, the problem of reconstitution becomes a serious one, requiring foresight and prior planning and preparation.”
• “Urban combat is mentally, physically, and emotionally exhausting, and the psychological effects on all participants (including health care personnel) can be devastating.”
• Citing seven factors that have historically led to the commission of war crimes: “(1) high friendly losses; (2) high turnover rate in the chain of command; (3) dehumanization of the adversary; (4) poorly trained or inexperienced troops; (5) the lack of a clearly defined adversary; (6) unclear orders; and (7) high frustration level among the troops.”
• “Urban operations may impact the abilities of national and theater strategic assets and can easily affect coverage of other geographical areas.”
• “The severe drain that urban operations can have on resources can cause either attacker or defender to exhaust capabilities earlier than anticipated.”
• Quoting from a book about the 1994 Russian invasion of Grozny in Chechnya: Russia’s battlefield generals “believed the erroneous assumptions generated at the strategic level and subsequently directed a woefully inadequate effort to understand the battlespace in all its complexity. This disregard for intelligence adversely affected virtually every other warfighting function at the operational level.”
• “Rapid urbanization is changing the physical and political face of nations. . . . In many places, this rapid urbanization has overburdened already weak infrastructure, scarce resources and fragile economic bases.”
• “In all operations, it is essential that routine activities such as providing sanitary services, food, law enforcement and health services be returned to civilian agencies as quickly as possible because of the demand they can place on joint force resources.”
• Quoting from Joint Military Operations Historical Collection: “The importance of understanding local politics and integrating indigenous decision makers into an urban operation cannot be overstated.”
• “Faced with superiority of U.S. forces, most adversaries seek an asymmetrical advantage. Urban areas are the natural battleground for terrorists.”
• Quoting long-time military reporter George Wilson, Air Force Times: “If you don’t understand the culture you are involved in; who makes decisions in these societies; how their infrastructure is designed; the uniqueness in their values and in their taboos–you aren’t going to be successful.”
• “The Joint Force Commander must give great care in the establishment of
population control measures, depending on the situation and characteristics
of that population. Inappropriate controls could exacerbate the populace and
resources control problem.”
This article appears in Sep 11-17, 2003.
